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Abstract
We consider n–player perfect information games with payoff functions having a
finite image. We do not make any further assumptions, so in particular we refrain
from making assumptions on the cardinality or the topology of the set of actions and
assumptions like continuity or measurability of payoff functions. We show that there
exists a best response cycle of length four, that is, a sequence (σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, σ0) of
pure strategy profiles where every successive element is a best response to the previous
one. This result implies the existence of point–rationalizable strategy profiles. When
payoffs are only required to be bounded, we show the existence of an –best response
cycle of length four for every  > 0.
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1 Introduction
We consider n–player perfect information games that are played over a tree of countably
infinite length. At every node of the tree, called a history, a single player chooses an
action. The resulting infinite sequence of actions is called a play and determines the payoff
for every player.
We are very general with respect to the assumptions put on the set of available actions
and the payoff functions. We make no assumptions on the set of available actions, so
in particular we abstain from making assumptions on its cardinality or its topology. We
assume payoff functions to have a finite image for some of our results and to have a bounded
image for others, so we make no continuity or measurability assumptions with respect to
payoff functions.
A special case of our set–up are win–lose games as studied by Gale and Stewart [1953].
Win–lose games are two–player zero–sum games where the payoff of a player is either zero
or one. Another way to describe such games is to introduce a winning set of plays. Player 1
gets a payoff of one if and only if the play is an element of the winning set. Such a game
is said to be determined if either player 1 has a winning strategy, i.e., a strategy that
guarantees the play to be an element of the winning set irrespective of the strategy chosen
by player 2, or player 2 has a winning strategy. It is easy to see that a win–lose game is
determined if and only if it has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Gale and Stewart
[1953] show that there are win–lose games that are not determined.
We first consider n–player games under the assumption that the payoff functions have a
finite image. Using elementary methods, we show that there exists a best response cycle of
length four, that is, a sequence of pure strategy profiles (σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, σ0) such that every
successive element is a best response to its predecessor. The strategy profiles forming a best
response cycle are point rationalizable (Bernheim [1984]) and they survive any procedure
of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002],
Chen, Van Long, and Luo [2007]).
Since a Nash equilibrium corresponds to a best response cycle of length one, the results
of Gale and Stewart [1953] demonstrate that even two–player zero–sum games may fail to
have a best response cycle of length one. Our results imply that there always exists a best
response cycle of length four.
We continue by weakening the assumption that payoff functions have a finite image to
the assumption that payoff functions have a bounded image. If, moreover, the payoff func-
tions were Borel measurable, then a result shown by Mertens and Neyman and reported in
Mertens [1986] is that, for every positive , an –Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists,
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and therefore an -best response cycle of length one exists. We show that boundedness of
the payoff functions is sufficient for the existence of an –best response cycle of length four.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces perfect information games and
Section 3 presents our results on the existence of best response cycles. The proof of the
main result, Theorem 3.1, is provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Perfect information games
Let N be the set of natural numbers including zero. Given a set A, we let A<N denote the
set of finite sequences of elements of A, including the empty sequence ø. A non–empty
sequence h ∈ A<N is written as h = (a0, . . . , at) for some t ∈ N. We let AN be the set of
countably infinite sequences p = (a0, a1, . . .) where at ∈ A for every t ∈ N.
A perfect information game consists of the following elements:
• A non–empty set of actions A.
• A set of histories H ⊆ A<N, which is required to be a pruned tree. That is: [1] ø ∈ H,
[2] if h = (a0, . . . , at′) ∈ H and 0 ≤ t ≤ t′, then (a0, . . . , at) ∈ H, and [3] if h ∈ H,
then there is a ∈ A such that (h, a) ∈ H. A play is an element p = (a0, a1, . . .) of AN
such that (a0, . . . , at) ∈ H for every t ∈ N. The set of all plays is denoted by P .
• A finite set of players I = {1, . . . , n}.
• A function ι : H → I that assigns an active player to every history. We let H i =
{h ∈ H : ι(h) = i} be the set of histories where player i is active.
• For every i ∈ I, a payoff function ui : P → R.
The reader will notice that we exclude “terminal histories” as we assume that some
action can be played after every history h ∈ H. Nevertheless, games with terminal histories
are encompassed as a special case of our set–up. For example, games of length two are
those where the payoff ui(p) depends only on the first two coordinates of p.
For two histories h, h′ ∈ H, we say that h′ follows h, denoted h ≤ h′, if either h = ø or
h = (a0, . . . , at) for some t ∈ N and h′ = (a0, . . . , at′) for some t′ ∈ N such that t ≤ t′. A
history h ∈ H is said to be a prefix of the play p = (a0, a1, . . .) if h = ø or h = (a0, . . . , at)
for some t ∈ N. Given h ∈ H, we let P (h) denote the set of all plays p ∈ P such that h is
a prefix of p. Let A(h) = {a ∈ A : (h, a) ∈ H} be the set of actions available at h.
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A pure strategy for player i is a function si with domain H i such that si(h) ∈ A(h)
for every h ∈ H i. We only consider pure strategies. Let Si be the set of player i’s pure
strategies and let S =
∏
i∈I S
i be the set of pure strategy profiles. Given s ∈ S and h ∈ H,
we write s(h) to mean si(h) for i = ι(h). The play induced by s is denoted by pi(s). We
write U i(s) = ui(pi(s)). Given s ∈ S and σi ∈ Si, we let s/σi denote the strategy profile
obtained from s by replacing player i’s strategy si by σi.
We work in Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice.
3 Best response cycles
We first state our definition and results for the case where for every player i ∈ I the payoff
functions ui have a finite image. A strategy σi ∈ Si is player i’s best response to the
strategy profile s ∈ S if for every τ i ∈ Si it holds that U i(s/τ i) ≤ U i(s/σi). Notice that
if the image of the payoff function ui is finite, player i always has a best response to any
strategy profile. A strategy profile σ ∈ S is said to be a best response to s ∈ S if for every
i ∈ I, σi is player i’s best response to s.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that for every i ∈ I the image of the payoff function ui is finite.
Then there exists a best response cycle of length 4, that is a sequence (σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, σ0) of
pure strategy profiles such that every successive element is a best response to the previous
one.
This result has important implications for the behavior of the best response map. For
s ∈ S let Bi(s) denote the set of player i’s best responses to s and let B(s) denote the
product set of best responses to s, thus
B(s) =
∏
i∈I
Bi(s).
Define the best response map B : 2S → 2S by letting B(ø) = ø and, for every non–empty
subset E of S,
B(E) =
⋃
s∈E
B(s).
By construction, the map B is monotone with respect to set inclusion, i.e. B(E) ⊆ B(E ′)
if E ⊆ E ′. Consequently, the set of fixed points of B is a complete lattice (Tarski [1955]).
Of course ø is a fixed point of B. The set F = ∪{E ∈ 2S : E ⊆ B(E)} is the greatest
fixed point of B. Now Theorem 3.1 implies that there is a non–empty set E ∈ 2S such
that E ⊆ B(E), for instance the set consisting of the four strategy profiles forming the
best response cycle. We thus obtain the following corollary.
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Corollary 3.2 Suppose that for every i ∈ I the image of the payoff function ui is finite.
Then the set F is non–empty.
Connection to determinacy: A win–lose game is said to be determined if either player 1
has a winning strategy, i.e., a strategy that guarantees the play to be an element of the
winning set irrespective of the strategy chosen by player 2, or player 2 has a winning
strategy. If we endow the set of plays P with a topology having as base the collection of
cylinder sets P (h) for h ∈ H, then it has been shown that a win–lose game is determined if
the winning set is closed (Gale and Stewart [1953]), Borel (Martin [1975]), or quasi–Borel
(Martin [1990]). Under these conditions, a win–lose game has a best response cycle of
length 1. Theorem 3.1 implies that any win–lose game has a best response cycle of length
4.
Connection to point rationalizability: Bernheim [1984, top of page 1015] defines the
map λ : 2S → 2S by
λ(E) =
∏
i∈I
⋃
s∈E
Bi(s).
The greatest fixed point of λ is the set of point rationalizable strategy profiles.
In the 2–player case, it holds that B(E) = λ(E) for every E ∈ 2S. This follows from
the fact that the set of best responses of player 1 to the strategy profile (s1, s2) depends
only on s2. If n > 2, it holds that B(E) ⊆ λ(E), while the converse inclusion is not true in
general. Essentially, the definition of B embodies the restriction that any two players hold
the same beliefs about a third player, a restriction that is not imposed under the definition
of λ.
The greatest fixed point F of B is contained in the greatest fixed point of λ. In
particular, if the sequence of strategy profiles (σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, σ0) is a best response cycle of
length 4, then the strategy profiles σ0, σ1, σ2, and σ3 are point rationalizable. Theorem 3.1
thus implies the existence of point rationalizable strategy profiles in perfect information
games where the payoff functions have a finite image.
Corollary 3.3 Suppose that for every i ∈ I the image of the payoff function ui is finite.
Then the set of point rationalizable strategy profiles is non–empty.
Connection to strict dominance: For every i ∈ I, consider sets Di ⊆ Ei ⊆ Si, and
let D =
∏
i∈I D
i and E =
∏
i∈I E
i. Following Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002], we write
E → D if D is obtained from E by eliminating strictly dominated strategies, that is, for
every i ∈ I, for every si ∈ Ei \ Di, there exists σi ∈ Ei such that for every s−i ∈ E−i it
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holds that U i(si, s−i) < U i(σi, s−i). We say that E ⊆ S is a reduction of S if there exists
a sequence S = E0 → E1 → · · · such that E = ∩m∈NEm.
It is easy to see that if E → D and F ⊆ E, then also F ⊆ D, where F is the greatest
fixed point of the map B. Consequently, any reduction of S contains F as a subset and
is non–empty. We thus conclude that the strategy profiles in F survive any procedure of
iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. This conclusion remains valid even
under a more permissive definition of reductions that allows for arbitrary transfinite se-
quences of sets as in Chen, Van Long, and Luo [2007], rather than just countable sequences
as in Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002].
Now we turn to the case where the image of ui is allowed to be any bounded set of
real numbers. The generalization of Theorem 3.1 is obtained through the concept of –best
response.
Let  be some positive real number. A strategy σi ∈ Si is said to be player i’s –
best response to the strategy profile s ∈ S if for every τ i ∈ Si it holds that U i(s/τ i) <
U i(s/σi) + . A strategy profile σ ∈ S is said to be an –best response to s ∈ S if for every
player i ∈ I, σi is an –best response to s.
Theorem 3.4 Suppose that for every i ∈ I the image of the payoff function ui is bounded.
Then for every  > 0 there exists an –best response cycle of length 4, that is a sequence
(σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, σ0) of pure strategy profiles such that every successive element is an –best
response to the previous one.
To deduce Theorem 3.4 from Theorem 3.1, for i ∈ I, let u¯i be defined by letting
u¯i(p) = min{m : ui(p) ≤ m}, where m takes integer values. Since ui is bounded, u¯i has
a finite image, and ui(p) ≤ u¯i(p) < ui(p) + . Let U¯ i denote the induced payoff function
over strategy profiles.
Let (σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, σ0) be a best response cycle of length 4 as in Theorem 3.1 for the
game with payoff functions (u¯1, . . . , u¯n). For k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, for every i ∈ I, for every
τ i ∈ Si, it holds that
U i(σk/τ
i) ≤ U¯ i(σk/τ i) ≤ U¯ i(σk/σik+1) < U i(σk/σik+1) + ,
where σi4 = σ
i
0. It therefore follows that (σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, σ0) is an -best response cycle of
length 4.
We define the maps Bi and B analogously to B
i and B. The map B is called the –best
response map. We let F denote the greatest fixed point of B. The following corollary is
immediate.
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Corollary 3.5 Suppose that for every i ∈ I the image of the payoff function ui is bounded.
Then for each  > 0 the set F is non–empty.
Let  be a positive real number. A pure strategy profile s ∈ S such that s ∈ B(s) is
called an –Nash equilibrium. An –Nash equilibrium corresponds to a best response cycle
of length 1. A result due to Mertens and Neyman (reported by Mertens [1986]) asserts that
a perfect information game admits an –Nash equilibrium for every  > 0 provided that the
payoff functions are bounded and Borel measurable. The proof of existence of –equilibria
in perfect information games by Mertens and Neyman relies on Borel determinacy as shown
in Martin [1975]. Therefore, if payoff functions are bounded and Borel measurable, then
there exists an –best response cycle of length 1. Theorem 3.4 implies that boundedness
of the payoff functions is sufficient to guarantee the existence of an –best response cycle
of length 4.
4 Proof of Theorem 3.1
For a game G as in Section 2 and a history h ∈ H, we define the subgame G(h) of G as the
game with set of actions A, set of players I, set of histories Hh = {e ∈ A<N : (h, e) ∈ H},
an assignment of active players ιh : Hh → I given by ιh(e) = ι(h, e), and payoff functions
given by uih(p) = u
i(h, p) for every play p of G(h). Here (h, e) and (h, p) are concatenations
defined in the obvious way. The induced payoff functions over strategy profiles are denoted
by U ih.
If σ is a strategy profile in G and τ a strategy profile in G(h), we say that σ agrees
with τ if σ(h, e) = τ(e) for every history e in G(h). We start out with a very easy lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Suppose that for every a ∈ A(ø) the subgame G(a) has a best response
cycle (σa,0, σa,1, σa,2, σa,3, σa,0) of length 4. Then the game G has a best response cycle
(σ0, σ1, σ2, σ4, σ0) of length 4 such that for every a ∈ A(ø) the strategy σk agrees with σa,k.
Proof: Let i = ι(ø). Let some k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} be given and let ak ∈ A(ø) be such that
U ia
(
σa,k−1/σia,k
)
is maximized over a ∈ A(ø). Define the strategy profile σk by σk(ø) = ak
and, for every a ∈ A(ø), by letting σk agree with σa,k in G(a). It is easy to see that
(σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, σ0) is a best response cycle of length 4 in G. 
For a play p = (a0, a1, . . .), we define p(0) = a0. A strategy profile s is said to have the
property that all players follow p if for every prefix h of p it holds that s(h) = a0 if h = ø
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and s(h) = at+1 if h = (a0, . . . , at) for some t ∈ N. Let wi be the highest possible payoff
for player i and let W i be the set of plays where the maximum is attained, so
wi = max
p∈P
ui(p) and W i = {p ∈ P : ui(p) = wi}.
Lemma 4.2 Let i = ι(ø). Suppose that there exist two plays, say p and q, such that
ui(p) = ui(q) = wi and p(0) 6= q(0). Then the game G has a best response cycle of length
4.
Proof: Let σ0 be a strategy profile such that all players follow p. Clearly, σ
i
0 is player
i’s best response to σ0. Choose some σ1 ∈ B(σ0) with σi1 = σi0 and choose σ2 ∈ B(σ1).
Symmetrically, let τ0 be a strategy profile such that all players follow q. Choose some
τ1 ∈ B(τ0) with τ i1 = τ i0 and choose τ2 ∈ B(τ1).
Let the strategy profiles s0, s1, s2, and s3 be such that
si0 = σ
i
0 and s
j
0(h) =
σ
j
0(h) if p(0) < h
τ j2 (h) if q(0) < h,
si1 = σ
i
0 and s
j
1(h) =
σ
j
1(h) if p(0) < h
τ j0 (h) if q(0) < h,
si2 = τ
i
0 and s
j
2(h) =
σ
j
2(h) if p(0) < h
τ j0 (h) if q(0) < h,
si3 = τ
i
0 and s
j
3(h) =
σ
j
0(h) if p(0) < h
τ j1 (h) if q(0) < h,
where j 6= i. Notice that s0 is a strategy profile such that all players follow p and s2 is a
strategy profile such that all players follow q.
We argue that s1 ∈ B(s0). To see that si1 is a best response to s0 for player i, notice
that pi(s0/s
i
1) = p, which is a maximizer of u
i. For j 6= i, it also holds that sj1 is a best
response to s0. Indeed, under s0 player i plays action p(0) at history ø, the same action
as under σ0. In the subgame G(p(0)), the strategy profile s0 coincides with σ0 while s
j
1
coincides with σj1. Since σ
j
1 is a best response to σ0, it follows that s
j
1 is a best response to
s0 for player j.
We argue that s2 ∈ B(s1). To see that si2 is a best response to s1 for player i, notice
that pi(s1/s
i
2) = q, which is a maximizer of u
i. For j 6= i, it also holds that sj2 is a best
response to s1. Indeed, under s1 player i plays action p(0) at history ø, the same action
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as under σ1. In the subgame G(p(0)), the strategy profile s1 coincides with σ1 while s
j
2
coincides with σj2. Since σ
j
2 is a best response to σ1, it follows that s
j
2 is a best response to
s1 for player j.
We argue that s3 ∈ B(s2). To see that si3 is a best response to s2 for player i, notice
that pi(s2/s
i
3) = q, which is a maximizer of u
i. For j 6= i, it also holds that sj3 is a best
response to s2. Indeed, under s2 player i plays action q(0) at history ø, the same action
as under τ0. In the subgame G(q(0)), the strategy profile s2 coincides with τ0 while s
j
3
coincides with τ j1 . Since τ
j
1 is a best response to τ0, it follows that s
j
3 is a best response to
s2 for player j.
We argue that s0 ∈ B(s3). To see that si0 is a best response to s3 for player i, notice that
pi(s3/s
i
0) = p, which is a maximizer of u
i. For j 6= i, it also holds that sj0 is a best response
to s3. Indeed, under s3 player i plays action q(0) at history ø, the same action as under τ1.
In the subgame G(q(0)), the strategy profile s3 coincides with τ1 while s
j
0 coincides with
τ j2 . Since τ
j
2 is a best response to τ1, it follows that s
j
0 is a best response to s3 for player j. 
Let ci denote the number of elements in the image of the function u
i and let c(G) =
c1 + · · · + cn. We now prove Theorem 3.1 by induction on c(G). Clearly, the conclusion
of Theorem 3.1 holds for any n–player game G with c(G) = n. Consider some ` > n and
assume that every n–player game G with c(G) < ` has a best response cycle of length 4.
By way of contradiction, suppose the n–player game G is such that c(G) = `, whereas G
has no best response cycle of length 4.
Using recursion, we define a sequence h0, h1, . . . of histories such that, for every t ∈ N,
history ht is of length t, ht′ ≤ ht if t′ ≤ t, and the subgame G(ht) has no best response
cycle of length 4. Let h0 = ø. By our supposition, G(h0) = G has no best response cycle
of length 4.
Let ht be a history of length t ∈ N such that G(ht) has no best response cycle of length
4 and define it = ι(ht). It holds that c(G(ht)) = `. Lemma 4.2 now implies that there is a
unique action at ∈ A such that W it ∩ P (ht) ⊆ P (ht, at). We define A′(ht) = A(ht) \ {at}.
For every a′ ∈ A′(ht), consider the subgame G(ht, a′). Every play of the subgame G(ht, a′)
yields player it a payoff strictly below w
it . Consequently, c(G(ht, a
′)) < ` and the induction
hypothesis implies that the subgame G(ht, a
′) has a best response cycle of length 4. Since
G(ht) has no best response cycle of length 4, Lemma 4.1 implies that G(ht, at) has no best
response cycle of length 4. We define ht+1 = (ht, at), which completes the recursion.
For i ∈ I, we define T i = {t ∈ N : ht ∈ H i and A′(ht) 6= ø}. Consider some t ∈
T i. Using the Axiom of Choice we can choose, for every a′ ∈ A′(ht), a best response
cycle (σt,a′,0, σt,a′,1, σt,a′,2, σt,a′,3, σt,a′,0) for the subgame G(ht, a
′). For k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, let
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xit,k(a
′) = ui(ht,a′)(pi(σt,a′,k/σ
i
t,a′,k+1)) be the payoff of player i in the subgame G(ht, a
′)
resulting from the strategy profile σt,a′,k/σ
i
t,a′,k+1 and let
yit,k = max
a′∈A′(ht)
xit,k(a
′).
For i ∈ I such that T i 6= ø, for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, we define
yik = max
t∈T i
yit,k.
Since the player set I is finite, there is t∗ ∈ T such that, for every i ∈ I with T i 6= ø, for
every k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3},
max
{t∈T i:t≤t∗}
yit,k = y
i
k.
Consider the game G∗ that is identical to the game G, except that for every t > t∗, the
only action available at history ht is at. Formally, let H
∗ be the set consisting of histories
h ∈ H such that if h follows a history of the form (ht, a) where t > t∗, then a = at. Let G∗
be a game with a set H∗ of histories, a function ι∗ equal to the restriction of ι to H∗, a set
of plays P ∗, payoff functions u∗i for i ∈ I equal to the restriction of ui to P ∗, and induced
payoff functions U∗i for i ∈ I.
The subgame G∗(ht∗ , at∗) has only one play, (at∗+1, at∗+2, . . .), so trivially has a best re-
sponse cycle of length 4. Applying Lemma 4.1 to the games G∗(ht∗), G∗(ht∗−1), . . . , G∗(h1),
and G∗(ø) = G∗ repeatedly, we find that the game G∗ has a best response cycle
(τ ∗0 , τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 , τ
∗
3 , τ
∗
0 )
such that, for every k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, for every t ≤ t∗, for every a′ ∈ A′(ht), the strategy τ ∗k
agrees with σt,a′,k. Notice that, for every t > t
∗, τ ∗k (ht) = at by definition of G
∗.
Next, for every k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, we extend τ ∗k to a strategy profile τk defined on the set
H of histories in the game G. For every h ∈ H∗, we define τk(h) = τ ∗k (h), and, for every
t > t∗, for every a′ ∈ A′(ht), we let τk agree with the strategy profile σt,a′,k. Notice that
pi(τk) and pi(τk/τ
i
k+1), i ∈ I, are plays in P ∗.
The following result completes the proof of the theorem as we obtain a contradiction
to our supposition that G has no best response cycle of length 4.
Lemma 4.3 The sequence (τ0, τ1, τ2, τ3, τ0) is a best response cycle of length 4 in G.
Proof: Let i ∈ I and k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} be given. We show that τ ik+1 is a best response of
player i to τk. Let α
i be any strategy of player i. Consider the play p = pi(τk/α
i). If p
belongs to P ∗, then ui(p) ≤ U∗i(τ ∗k/τ ∗ik+1) = U i(τk/τ ik+1), where the inequality follows since
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τ ∗ik+1 is a best response of player i to τ
∗
k in G
∗ and the equality holds because τ ∗k/τ
∗i
k+1 and
τk/τ
i
k+1 are identical on H
∗.
Now consider the case where p does not belong to P ∗. Then it has a prefix of the form
(ht+ , a
+), where t+ > t∗ and a+ ∈ A′(ht+). Since a+ 6= at+ , it follows that it+ = i. Since τk
agrees with the strategy profile σt+,a+,k inG(ht+ , a
+), it holds that ui(p) ≤ xit+,k(a+) ≤ yit+,k.
By the choice of t∗ there is some t− ∈ T i such that t− ≤ t∗, it− = i, and yit+,k ≤ yit−,k. Take
any action a− ∈ A′(ht−) such that xit−,k(a−) = yit−,k and a strategy βi of player i in the
game G∗ such that βi(ht) = at for every t < t−, βi(ht−) = a−, and βi agrees with σit−,a−,k+1
in the subgame G(ht− , a
−). Since U∗i(τ ∗k/β
i) = yit−,k, we find that
U i(τk/α
i) ≤ U∗i(τ ∗k/βi) ≤ U∗i(τ ∗k/τ ∗ik+1) = U i(τk/τ ik+1).

5 Conclusion
Even win–lose games, two–player zero-sum perfect information games where the payoff of a
player is either zero or one, may fail to have Nash equilibria or, equivalently, best–response
cycles of length one. We consider general n-player perfect information games, where the
payoff functions of the players have a finite image. We do not make any assumptions on
the set of available actions and we do not make any further assumptions on the payoff
functions. We show that in any such game there is a best–response cycle of length four.
This result implies the existence of point–rationalizable strategy profiles. The strategies
in a best response cycle cannot be eliminated by any procedure of iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies. For the case of payoff functions with a bounded image, we
find that there is always an -best response cycle of length four.
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